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GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
PRICE WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS
JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most vexing problems in the application of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act concerns the extent to which this omnibus anti-discrimination
statute should limit an employer’s opportunity to place constraints on the ways
in which its employees present themselves to the public. Specifically, does the
statutory ban on sex-based discrimination have any application to employment
policies or individual employment decisions that penalize individuals for the
way they present themselves in terms of attire and behavior or for other aspects
of their sexual identity, including their choice of sexual partners?
The Supreme Court has articulated a doctrinal framework that, if construed
and applied properly, provides the lower federal courts with the analytical tools
necessary to identify and proscribe workplace rules that compel individuals to
adhere to appearance, attire, and behavioral norms that operate to reinforce
1
gendered expectations. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that penalizing an
individual for failing to conform to gendered norms of behavior constitutes a
2
form of sex-based discrimination, one would expect that employees would have
achieved some measure of success in challenging such policies. Yet although the
lower federal courts acknowledge, in the abstract, that gender nonconformity is
a form of unlawful sex-based discrimination, when it comes to scrutinizing
challenges to workplace dress and appearance codes brought by individuals
whose presentation of self reflects their nontraditional lifestyle these courts
typically choose to classify the motivation behind the subject rules as reflective
of prejudice based on sexual orientation or transgendered status, rather than on
the enforcement of sex-based stereotypes. Then, because Title VII consistently
has been construed not to proscribe discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation or transgendered identity, the courts have been unwilling to strike
down these sorts of employment decisions. A review of the extant lower court
jurisprudence reveals that these courts have been disinclined to apply the
Supreme Court’s gender nonconformity doctrine to cases involving individuals
who are subject to workplace discrimination because of the way they look,
behave, or identify themselves. By focusing on the fact that most of the plaintiffs
who claim that they have been subjected to gendered stereotypes lead, or appear
to lead unconventional lifestyles, particularly gays or transsexuals, the courts
* Jack M. Gordon Professor of Procedural Law & Jurisdiction, Tulane Law School.
1. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
2. See id.
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typically refuse to rule in their favor or even allow them to present their cases to
3
juries.
II. PHILLIPS AND THE “SEX-PLUS” DOCTRINE
This story begins with the Supreme Court’s 1971 ruling in Phillips v. Martin
4
Marietta Corp. Ida Phillips claimed that her employer’s policy of refusing to
accept job applications from women—but not men—with pre-school aged
5
children violated Title VII’s ban on sex-based discrimination in employment.
Martin Marietta made no effort to cloak its motivation for the rule. The
corporation’s policy was aimed neither at protecting pre-school aged children
from the evils associated with working parents nor at protecting itself from the
hazards of employing workers with pre-school aged children. It couldn’t be.
After all, Martin Marietta was perfectly happy to employ the fathers of these
offspring. Manifestly, the one and only reason that the corporation initiated and
maintained this policy was that it assumed that the mothers—but not the
fathers—of such young tykes would not report to work when their charges fell
6
ill.
Both the trial judge and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted
7
summary judgment to the defendant. Since Martin Marietta indisputably
employed an overwhelming number of women in the position sought by Ms.
Phillips, the courts concluded that the corporation’s policy raised “no question
8
of bias against women as such.” In a single paragraph, per curiam ruling, the
9
Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded the case to the lower courts.
The Supreme Court’s ruling was not based on the lower courts’ failure to
recognize that Martin Marietta was imposing a job requirement—not having
pre-school aged children—on women that it did not apply to men. Rather, the
Court reasoned that the lower courts had erred in making a pretrial ruling that
10
the policy was enforceable as a matter of law. The Court left open the
possibility that further development of the record could reveal that the mothers
of pre-school aged children might indeed have family obligations not faced by
11
men which could render them less capable of performing their jobs. Thus,
although the Court rightfully acknowledged that this particular employment
practice was, as a prima facie matter, facially sex-differentiated, it also declared
that the company, on remand, might be able to establish that its policy was
12
justified under Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense.

3. See infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
4. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
5. Id. at 543.
6. Id. at 544 (Marshall, J., concurring).
7. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 1968 WL 140 (M.D. Fla. July 9, 1968), aff’d, 411 F.2d 1 (5th
Cir. 1969).
8. 400 U.S. at 543.
9. Id. at 544.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. Justice Marshall agreed with the decision to remand, but strenuously objected to the
suggestion that sex could operate as a BFOQ in this instance. He insisted that application of the
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Although the Phillips Court’s terse opinion did not offer any detailed
explanation for its conclusion that the plaintiff at least had made a prima facie
showing that she had been subjected to a sex-based employment practice, it did
not take the lower courts long to draw an ill-conceived doctrine out of the
Court’s sparse text. The Phillips Court expressly had ruled that it was
insufficient, as a matter of law, for the company to defeat the plaintiff’s claim of
sex discrimination merely by demonstrating that it had hired many other
13
women for the job she had sought. A facially sex-differentiated policy that
excluded a sub-group of women could, in the absence of a BFOQ-based
justification, violate the statutory ban on sex-based discrimination. The
unanswered question was whether the Phillips Court meant to strike down any
and all job requirements that compelled female employees or job applicants to
hurdle obstacles that were not placed in the path of their male counterparts. The
answer was quick in coming.
The lower courts promptly fashioned a broad limitation to the Court’s
14
ruling in Phillips—the doctrinally misleading “sex-plus” theory. Paralleling the
Title VII notion that biological sex was an impermissible basis for classification
because the individual had no control over his or her membership in that group,
the courts determined that any “plus” factor used to separate out “acceptable”
from unemployable women similarly had to rely on either an immutable trait or
characteristic, or to implicate some “fundamental” right. The ruling in Phillips fit
into this doctrinal construct, the courts explained, because Martin Marietta’s
15
fatal mistake was not simply engaging in intra-sex discrimination, but
implementing a requirement that interfered with the fundamental right of childrearing.
This interpretation of Phillips, in turn, left the door open for other policies
that excluded different sub-categories of female—or, less frequently, male—
workers from employment, under what the courts deemed to be less
consequential or otherwise volitional factors. For example, when employers
subjected female, but not male (or male but not female) employees or job
applicants to requirements relating to height, weight, attire, or appearance,
some, but not all members of the targeted group were disadvantaged. The
undisputed fact that only one of the two sex groups was subjected to these
additional job standards was not deemed sufficient per se to constitute a prima
facie case of sex-based discrimination. Rather, the courts invoked their
circumscribed version of the sex-plus doctrine, deciding the case on the basis of

BFOQ defense to this specific employment policy served only to perpetuate the stereotyped notion
that women are assigned the primary role as child care provider. And excluding women from
employment opportunities in reliance on such stereotypes, he maintained, was precisely what Title
VII was designed to proscribe. Id. at 544–45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 543.
14. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975); Dolter v.
Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D.Iowa 1980); Valdes v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 507
F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir.
1980); Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977).
15. I use “sex” to refer to the biological, physiological, or chromosomal classification of an
individual, while “gender” refers to cultural expectations and assumptions associated with an
individual’s biological, chromosomal, or physiological classification.

06__FRIEDMAN.DOC

208 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/8/2007 2:04 PM

Volume 14:205

2007

whether the instant “plus” factor was sufficiently consequential or non16
volitional to warrant statutory condemnation.
The impact of the lower courts’ development of this analytically challenged
“sex-plus” doctrine was compounded when they extended its application
beyond the category of sex-based differentiation to cases involving the statutory
ban on national-origin discrimination. Employers who required bilingual
employees to speak only English in the workplace were found not to have
17
discriminated on the basis of national origin. Then, only five years after Phillips,
a private sector employer punished women for procreating by expressly
withholding non-occupational disability benefits from female employees who
18
became pregnant. This company’s action constituted an obvious example of the
very “sex plus” discrimination that Phillips proscribed precisely because of its
deleterious impact on a fundamental right—the right to procreate. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court concocted a cost-based justification for its ruling that
discrimination on the basis of this quintessential reflection of traditional female
19
identity—pregnancy—did not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex.
The predominant rationale underlying the immutability-mutability
paradigm is that in enacting Title VII Congress intended to proscribe only
discrimination based on the possession of a characteristic over which the
individual had no control. And the “fundamental right” element of the “sexplus” or “national origin-plus” doctrines was designed to avoid extending the
application of the statute to cases of perceived de minimis harm. Both of these
explanations, however, either overlook or ignore this legislation’s bedrock
commitment to preserving human worth and personal dignity. Just as biological
sex, national origin, race, or religion are central components of individual
16. See, e.g., Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1985) (sexdifferentiated dress code is not unlawful sex-based discrimination), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986);
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (male-only short hair
length requirement neither infringes upon a fundamental right nor differentiates on the basis of an
immutable characteristic); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977) (enforcement of
male-only hair length requirement does not constitute sex-based discrimination); E.E.O.C. v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 1980 WL 288 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1980) (female-only maximum weight policy does not
violate Title VII because weight is neither an immutable characteristic nor a constitutionallyprotected category); Cox v. Delta Air Lines, 1976 WL 730 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1976) (female-only
height/weight policy does not constitute unlawful sex discrimination because weight is neither an
immutable characteristic nor a constitutionally-protected category), aff’d, 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977).
But see Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (requirement that only female
flight attendants adhere to maximum weight requirement held violative of Title VII even though
weight is a mutable characteristic; court makes no reference to mutability or fundamental interest
analysis), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983).
17. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 128
(1994); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). But see
Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006).
18. Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976) (holding that the policy was nondiscriminatory in that there was no risk protecting one gender and not the other and that “simply
because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive benefits; that is to say, gender-based
discrimination does not result simply because an employer’s disability-benefits plan is less than allinclusive”).
19. Id. at 138–40, n.17, 18. Congress responded to this ruling in 1978 with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-k (2000)), expressly amending Title VII’s definition of “sex discrimination” to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.

06__FRIEDMAN.DOC

2/8/2007 2:04 PM

THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE

209

identity, other characteristics or traits that involve the presentation of self, such
as appearance, language, and lifestyle, regardless of their mutability or
immutability, are similarly essential to an individual’s sense of self and self20
worth. Consequently, these aspects of individuality are no less deserving of
statutory protection. Minimizing their importance by characterizing them as
“mutable” or “non-fundamental” is, therefore, inconsistent with the overarching
objective of anti-discrimination law, i.e., the elimination of arbitrary obstacles to
full participation in the employment arena. Although some appearance or dress
codes might be justifiable under the limited statutory and judicially-created
defenses to Title VII claims, sex-differentiated appearance and grooming codes,
at a minimum, should be viewed as constituting a prima facie case of sex-based
discrimination.
Over the years, however, some courts modified the harshness of the
fundamental right/immutability analysis by offering an alternative standard. A
plaintiff challenging a sex-differentiated dress or grooming requirement also can
state a prima facie claim of sex-plus discrimination by establishing that the rule
imposes an “undue burden” on members of one sex. But as the Ninth Circuit’s
21
recent en banc opinion in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., forcefully
demonstrates, the presence of the “undue burden” operation proves to be of
marginal utility to plaintiffs who challenge the enforcement of most dress or
22
grooming codes.
In Jespersen, the defendant imposed a unisex uniform requirement, but also
23
enforced a grooming policy that was sex-differentiated. It required female
beverage servers and bartenders to wear make-up but prohibited males from
doing so. It also insisted that male, but not female, bartenders have short24
cropped hair. When Darlene Jespersen refused to comply with Harrah’s
makeup requirement, she lost her job. She subsequently brought suit under Title
VII, alleging that wearing makeup made her feel sick, degraded, exposed, and
interfered with her ability to effectively perform her job because it detracted
25
from her credibility and conflicted with her self-image.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Harrah’s on the
ground that the policy did not amount to sex-plus discrimination because it did
26
not differentiate on the basis of an immutable sex-linked characteristics.
Alternatively, it ruled, the policy did not discriminate on the basis of sex because
27
it imposed equal burdens on members of both sexes. Both men and women had

20. See generally Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination
Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769 (1987).
21. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
22. See id. at 1110.
23. Id. at 1105–06.
24. Id. at 1106.
25. Id. at 1107–08. See generally Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The
Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at Work, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105–52 (Joel Wm.
Friedman ed., Foundation Press 2006) (provides a revealing analysis of how the strategies employed
by Ms. Jespersen’s attorneys affected the Ninth Circuit’s disposition of her appeal).
26. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d
1076 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
27. 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
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to comply with sex-differentiated policies—women were required to wear
makeup and men were required to have their hair cut to a length above the
28
collar. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel applied the undue burden test and
determined that the plaintiff had not established that the employer’s policy
29
imposed a greater burden on women than on men. The plaintiff-appellant had
argued that the makeup requirement imposed a heavier burden on females
because of the cost of purchasing makeup and the expenditure of time required
30
to apply it. But since the plaintiff had offered no evidence to support that claim,
the panel concluded that she had failed even to raise a triable issue of fact as to
whether the makeup requirement imposed unequal burdens on male and female
31
employees. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary
32
judgment in favor of the defendant.
33
This ruling was upheld by the entire court in its en banc opinion. It agreed
that the mere presence of sex-differentiated requirements did not establish per se
a prima facie claim of sex-based discrimination and demanded evidence that the
34
policy imposed an undue burden on members of one sex. It then noted that the
only evidence tendered by the plaintiff was (1) her deposition testimony that she
found the makeup requirement offensive and that it interfered with her ability
to perform her job, and (2) customer feedback and employer evaluation forms
35
that attested to her outstanding performance. That showing, the en banc
majority ruled, was insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact on the
36
presence of an unequal burden on women. To demonstrate unequal burden,
the court required the presentation of evidence that the policy would impose an
37
undue burden on the class of women as a whole. And as to this, the en banc
court rejected the plaintiff’s request that it take judicial notice of the fact that it
cost more money and took more time for a woman to comply with the makeup
38
requirement than it took for a man to comply with the short hair mandate.
Thus, since the plaintiff had not produced any discovery documents supporting
this claim, the en banc court agreed with the panel that she had not offered any
39
evidence to support her claim of undue burden.
Not only did the court refuse to take note of the obvious fiscal and
temporal costs associated with the employer’s makeup requirement, it did not
consider the possibility that by subjecting only women to this socially-derived
ritual, the employer was enforcing, and the court was sanctioning, a type of
physical branding or differentiation of female employees that serves to reinforce
both the male behavioral norm and the traditionally dominant role enjoyed by
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1192–93.
392 F.3d at 1082.
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1083.
444 F.3d at 1113.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1108.
Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1111.
Id.
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men (and the correspondingly subordinate position ascribed to females) in the
40
market place.
Thus, the rulings in Jespersen demonstrate that reliance upon the undue
burden formulation of the “sex-plus” doctrine as the analytical basis for judicial
determination that appearance codes constitute a form of sex-based
discrimination proscribed by Title VII has not been, and shows no promise of
being, successful. But, in a 1989 case most popularly known for its ruling on
another, though related, issue, the Supreme Court articulated an alternative
theory of sex-based discrimination that is directly applicable to these cases and
offers plaintiffs a potentially more effective method of successfully attacking
41
such workplace rules.
III. PRICE WATERHOUSE AND THE SEX-STEREOTYPING DOCTRINE
42

In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court offered another perspective on
how the presence of sex-based discrimination could be proven. Under what is
now referred to as the sex-stereotyping principle, the Court declared that a
plaintiff could demonstrate that she had been the victim of sex-based
discrimination by establishing that the employer’s challenged action had been
triggered by her failure to conform to its sex-stereotyped expectations.
Nevertheless, while the lower courts proclaim fealty to this legal rule, they
choose to apply it in a manner that vitiates its viability.
At the end of a five-year stint as a senior manager in the Government
Services Department of “Big-8” accounting firm, Price Waterhouse, Ann
43
Hopkins, was recommended for partnership. As part of its partnership review
44
process, the firm solicited the written comments of all partners. Although the
partners who supervised her work endorsed Hopkins’s candidacy, praising her
professional accomplishments and character, other partners accompanied their
negative votes with critical statements that reflected their disapproval of her
45
personality. The latter group of unfavorable comments included one labeling
Hopkins as “macho,” another suggesting that she enroll in “a course at charm
school,” and yet another opining that Hopkins “overcompensated for being a
46
woman.” Hopkins’ direct supervising partner and mentor informed her that
the Price Waterhouse Policy Board had decided not to submit her name for a
vote by the entire partnership, but to hold her candidacy for reconsideration the
47
following year, because she had irritated the firm’s senior partners. To enhance
her likelihood of success in the following year’s reconsideration process, he

40. Id. at 1110. See generally Carbado, supra note 25.
41. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.
42. Id.
43. See Cynthia Estlund, The Story of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
STORIES 68 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., Foundation Press 2006).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 235.
47. Id.
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counseled that Hopkins should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
48
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”
When the partners in the Government Services Department subsequently
refused to submit her name for reconsideration, Hopkins filed suit alleging that
Price Waterhouse’s handling of her partnership candidacy amounted to sexbased discrimination in violation of Title VII. District Judge Gerhard Gesell
agreed with the testimony of an expert witness that Price Waterhouse’s
partnership selection process had been tainted by the firm’s reliance on
49
comments which themselves were the product of sex stereotyping. Judge
Gesell also found, however, that the firm harbored legitimate reservations about
Hopkins’s interpersonal skills and that it had not relied upon those concerns
50
simply because Hopkins was a woman. Nevertheless, because Price
Waterhouse had relied on some of its partners’ sex-stereotyped judgments about
51
the plaintiff, he ruled in her favor on the liability issue. Ann Hopkins had been
a victim of sex-based discrimination. Then, with respect to the issue of remedies,
Judge Gesell ruled that the defendant could avoid equitable relief by proving,
through clear and convincing evidence, that it would have placed Hopkins’s
candidacy on hold had it not considered the sex-stereotyped comments
52
contained in the partners’ evaluations. But, in his view, Price Waterhouse had
53
not made such a showing. Nevertheless, because Hopkins had resigned half a
year after the firm’s decision on her partnership candidacy and had not
convinced Gesell that her resignation amounted to a constructive discharge, i.e.,
that her employer’s conduct made her position so untenable and intolerable that
any reasonable person in her situation would have felt compelled to resign,
Judge Gesell did not order Price Waterhouse to reinstate Hopkins or to provide
54
her with any backpay. He issued only a declaratory judgment and an award of
55
attorney fees.
A majority of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel embraced Judge
Gesell’s rulings that reliance on sex stereotyping could and, in this case, did
56
constitute sex-based discrimination. It disagreed, however, with his assessment
of the relevance of a determination that the defendant would have reached the
same decision in the absence of any discriminatory considerations. For the
appellate panel, the “same decision” defense did not merely limit the remedy
that the plaintiff could recover; it operated as an affirmative defense to liability
itself. But since the appellate panel agreed with Judge Gesell that Price
Waterhouse had not established the same decision defense by clear and
convincing evidence, the majority upheld his judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The panel delivered a total victory to Ms. Hopkins when, unlike the trial judge,

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1121 (D.D.C. 1985).
Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1120.
Id.
Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1122.
825 F.2d 458.
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it ruled in favor of her constructive discharge claim and remanded the case for a
determination of the appropriate remedy, suggesting that it would be
“appropriate for the court to award Hopkins the full relief to which she is
57
entitled.”
As the Supreme Court made clear in the introductory paragraph of its
opinion, the only issue submitted to it for review was the allocation of the
burdens of proof in cases involving an employment decision that was the
58
product of both legitimate and discriminatory motives. Although Justice
Brennan’s opinion for the Court attracted only three other votes—Justices
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens—Justices White and O’Connor issued
concurring opinions in which they agreed with the plurality’s statement
concerning the treatment of “mixed motive” cases. Thus, the six justices
59
endorsed the evidentiary framework confected by the D.C. Circuit. The same
decision defense, if established, meant that the defendant would prevail and
60
escape liability.
The ruling in Price Waterhouse spawned a new generation of “mixed
motive” cases. For the next couple of years, all eyes focused predominantly on
that aspect of the Court’s decision. This decision, like several other opinions
issued by the Court in 1989 that cut back on the Court’s previously broad
interpretations of Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes, generated a
significant amount of public controversy and served as the impetus for a direct
legislative response. In 1991, Congress passed, and President Bush signed, the
61
1991 Civil Rights Act designed expressly to reverse the Supreme Court’s
statutory rulings in several of these cases. With specific reference to Price
Waterhouse, Congress reversed the portion of the opinion dealing with the
62
impact of the same decision defense. It replaced the Court’s broad application
of that defense with the formulation initially devised by Judge Gesell. Under
this statute, the same decision defense restricted only the remedy available to
plaintiff; it did not relieve the defendant of liability. Moreover, since § 107 of the
1991 Civil Rights Act also amended Title VII by codifying the other half of the
Price Waterhouse Court’s formulation of the mixed motive analysis—i.e., that the
plaintiff need only establish that sex or some other forbidden factor was a

57. Id. at 473.
58. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232 (1989) (plurality opinion).
59. Id. at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (maintaining that by departing from the extant
evidentiary scheme theretofore routinely applied to all claims of disparate treatment pursuant to the
Court’s rulings in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Dep’t of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the plurality had created doctrinal confusion and improperly
transferred the burden of proving causation from the plaintiff to the defendant).
60. Id. at 252–53 (plurality opinion). The plurality, as well as concurring Justices White and
O’Connor, agreed that the circuit court had erred in subjecting defendants to a “clear and
convincing” standard of proof with respect to the same decision defense. The plurality and two
concurring Justices declared that the proper standard was the traditional standard applied in civil
cases—preponderance of the evidence. See Id. at 252–53; 490 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring); 490
U.S. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
61. Pub. L. No. 102-166 (1991).
62. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(b) (amending Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), by adding § 706(g)
(2)(B) in order to provide a limitation on available relief in mixed motive cases).
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63

motivating factor for the employer’s challenged action —the statute supplanted
the ruling in Price Waterhouse and, consequently, the case’s precedential value
64
appears to have evaporated.
Such a conclusion is not, however, entirely correct. The Supreme Court
plurality opinion did not end with its enunciation of a mixed motive evidentiary
scheme. Nevertheless, since most attention had focused on that portion of the
opinion, a subsidiary ruling associated with the application of that evidentiary
structure to the instant facts went relatively unnoticed. With the legislative
trumping of the Court’s evidentiary standard, however, this comparatively
ignored segment of the decision could turn into the opinion’s most enduring
legacy.
In order to resolve whether or not Ann Hopkins had established a prima
facie claim of liability, the Court had to determine whether Price Waterhouse had
relied on some consideration of her sex in its treatment of her partnership
application. The trial judge had found that Hopkins had been the victim of sexbased discrimination based on the company’s reliance on sex-stereotyped
comments about her personality, behavior, and appearance. On appeal, the
company maintained that evidence of its reliance on sex stereotyping was both
nonexistent and legally irrelevant. The Supreme Court plurality emphatically
rejected these arguments. Not only did it uphold Judge Gesell’s finding that
65
Price Waterhouse had engaged in sex stereotyping, it, more significantly,
declared:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their

63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
64. Post-Price Waterhouse, several circuit courts seized on the language in Justice O’Connor’s
concurring opinion limiting the mixed motive doctrine to cases involving direct evidence of
discrimination since her vote in support of the Court’s judgment turned the plurality into a majority
of five. However, the notion that this was part of the “holding” in Price Waterhouse was debunked by
the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling to the contrary in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90
(2003) (holding unanimously that the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s codification of the mixed motive
doctrine into Title VII did not contain such a heightened evidentiary standard and, therefore, that
the mixed motive framework could apply regardless of whether proof of reliance on a forbidden
factor came in the form of direct or circumstantial evidence).
65. Justice O’Connor agreed with Judge Gesell’s findings that Price Waterhouse relied on
statements noting Hopkins’ failure to conform to sex stereotypes and that the plaintiff established
that presence of “discriminatory input” into the decision making process. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S.
261, 272–73 (O’Connor, J., concurring). She wrote separately primarily to set forth her
characterization of the mixed motive doctrine as a limited supplement to the traditional McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine formulation. In her view, the mixed-motive formula and its consequent shifting of
the burden of persuasion on but-for causation to the defendant should be available only in cases
where the plaintiff offered “direct” evidence that a forbidden factor had played a “substantial” role
in the employment decision. Id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice White’s brief concurring
opinion, however, does not expressly address the issue of sex stereotyping as a form of sex-based
discrimination. Nevertheless, he agreed with the plurality that the record supported Judge Gesell’s
finding that Hopkins had been subjected to sex stereotyping. He also agreed with the plurality’s
conclusion that Hopkins established that sex was a motivating factor for the employer’s decision. Id.
at 259 (White, J., concurring). His decision to write a separate opinion stems from his objection to the
plurality’s suggestion that the defendant could only sustain its burden as to the same decision
defense through the presentation of “objective” evidence.
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group for [i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because
of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. Los Angeles Dept. of
Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 1375, n. 13, 55
L.Ed.2d 657 (1978), quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198
(CA7 1971). An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.
66
Title VII lifts women out of this bind.

As this quotation reveals, the ruling in Price Waterhouse was not the first
time the Supreme Court had denounced the use of sex stereotypes in a Title VII
case alleging sex-based discrimination. Eleven years earlier, the Court had
struck down a policy that required female employees to make larger
contributions to an employee-funded pension plan than comparable male
67
employees. In Los Angeles Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, the defendant
maintained that because—according to mortality tables—women on the average
outlive men, the average female employee would receive more monthly pension
payments than the average man. Accordingly, the defendant reasoned that it
was entitled to charge female employees a higher premium in order to offset the
68
average longer (and thereby larger) lifetime pay-out.
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and emphasized that this case
did not involve a decision based on an actual difference between all men and all
69
women. Rather, the actuarial statistics reflected only a generalized statement
70
that was accurate for many but definitely not all women. The Court declared
that Title VII’s “unambiguous” focus on the individual precluded the
application of a generally valid stereotype to an individual as to whom it did not
71
or might not apply. Subjecting all women to the generally, but not universally
applicable longevity expectation, the Court ruled, constituted unlawful sex72
based discrimination. Expanding beyond these narrow parameters, Justice
Stevens also announced that “[i]t is now well recognized that employment
decisions cannot be predicated on mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the
characteristics of males or females. Myths and purely habitual assumptions
about a woman’s inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer
acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying
73
them less.”
After renouncing the use of sex as a proxy for longevity on the contribution
side of pension funding, it was inevitable that the Court would weigh in on the
similarly justified use of sex as a surrogate measure of longevity on the benefit
pay-out side of this equation. Five years after its ruling in Manhart, the Court

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 251 (plurality opinion).
City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
Id. at 702.
Id. at 708–09.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id. at 707.
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examined an optional, fully employee-funded retirement plan that required
participating employees to choose from a short list of participating insurers, all
of which relied on sex-based mortality tables to calculate the monthly benefit
payments. As in Manhart, sex was the only factor used to determine longevity of
individuals of the same age. Relying on Manhart, the Court, in Arizona Governing
74
Committee v. Norris, invalidated the State of Arizona’s plan under Title VII. The
statutory ban on sex discrimination precluded an employer from relying on
gross gender-based stereotypes, even when they were predicated upon
generally verifiable assumptions, and even in a plan in which participation was
optional. This use of a sex stereotype, the Court ruled, was “no more permissible
75
at the pay-out stage of a retirement plan than at the pay-in stage.”
76
77
But both Manhart and Norris dealt with a situation where an employer
had relied on a stereotype that was predicated on a generally, although not
universally valid premise. This is not the problem confronting employees who
are compelled to conform to dress and appearance codes. These behavioral and
appearance expectations are predicated on the “myths and purely habitual
assumptions” to which Justice Stevens alluded, but were not present, in Norris.
Consequently, it is the Court’s subsequent ruling in Price Waterhouse that is its
most clearly applicable decision to any stereotype-based claim of sex
discrimination under Title VII.
IV. PRICE WATERHOUSE’S APPLICATION TO APPEARANCE AND GROOMING CODES
The Price Waterhouse Court’s recognition that employer decisions affecting
the terms and conditions of employment of individuals who refuse or fail to
conform to sex stereotyped expectations constitute a form of statutorily
proscribed sex-based discrimination had repercussions that potentially
reverberated far beyond situations such as the one that confronted Ann
Hopkins. Ann Hopkins was, as the Price Waterhouse plurality recognized, caught
in the classic double-bind that confronts many women in traditionally male78
dominated working environments. Rejecting the company’s contention that
sex-stereotyping did not amount to proscribed sex discrimination, the Court
declared that “[a]n employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but
whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and

74. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
75. Id. at 1081. Indeed, even prior to the Court’s rulings in Manhart and Norris, two circuit courts
had struck down sex-differentiated dress and grooming policies because they embodied and
codified sex stereotypes to an extent that was deemed particularly demeaning to women. See Sprogis
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding that requiring female flight
attendants to be unmarried violates Title VII because “Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes”); Carroll v.
Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding that dress code
requiring all female employees to wear uniform while males could wear standard business attire is
prima facie unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII because it is demeaning to women, and
wearing a uniform suggests a lesser professional status than is ascribed to men wearing regular
business clothing).
76. 435 U.S. at 702.
77. 463 U.S. at 1073.
78. See Estlund, supra note 43, at 93–94.
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impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job
79 80
if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind. “
Nevertheless, there is no express language in any of the Price Waterhouse
opinions limiting the Court’s denunciation of sex-stereotyping to the doublebind scenario. Both Judge Gesell and the Supreme Court plurality relied on
those portions of the partners’ evaluations that referred critically to Hopkins’
failure to dress and behave like a stereotypical woman as justification for their
determination that Hopkins had made a prima facie showing of sex-based
81
discrimination in the firm’s decision not to make her a partner.
The formulation of, and reliance on, sex-stereotyped expectations extends
far beyond those personality traits involved in Ann Hopkins’ case. Cases like
Jespersen remind us that employers readily have imposed a wide range of
appearance, behavior, and dress standards on their employees, many of which
derive directly from traditional conceptions of how men and women should
appear, dress, and behave. Moreover, the targets of these policies are not always
women. Particularly, though not exclusively, in the context of behavioral
expectations, men are frequently subjected to disapproving reactions and
adverse employment consequences when and because they are perceived as
acting in a manner that does not meet stereotyped conceptions of male behavior.
The potential application of Price Waterhouse’s gender stereotype doctrine
to cases involving plaintiffs that have been targeted because of their appearance
or perceived behavior has presented the federal courts with a unique set of
analytical challenges. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon is that
gendered expectations often are linked to aspects of both sexual orientation and
transgender identity. And anytime a case contains even so much as a hint of a
reference to sexual orientation or transgendered identity, the courts run up
against the well-established and universally-adopted jurisprudence that Title
VII’s ban on sex-based discrimination does not extend to claims of bias based on
82
83
sexual orientation and transgendered status. Consequently, the courts
struggle with the question of whether the plaintiff has either plead or proved
that this alleged discriminatory conduct was motivated by her failure to
conform to gender-based stereotypes (a potential winning formula) or because
of hostility to his sexual orientation or transgendered status (a sure-fire loser). It

79. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
80. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 235. See also Estlund, supra note 43, at 98–99. See generally Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man In the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 918–19 (2002) (“What
is intolerable in these cases [including Price Waterhouse] is not that the demands are contradictory,
but rather that either demand is made at all.”) (alteration added).
82. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d
138 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989); DeSantis v.
Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
83. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985);
Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). See generally Patricia A. Cain, Stories from the Gender Garden: Transsexuals
and Anti-Discrimination Law, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1321 (1998); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in EuroAmerican Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1995).
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is, therefore, worth examining the extent, if any, to which the Price Waterhouse
sex-stereotyping doctrine has been or should be applied in these contexts. Can
individuals who are diminished, demeaned, or otherwise disadvantaged in the
workplace because they fail or refuse to conform to employment policies
predicated upon gendered behavioral or appearance expectations state a claim
of sex-based discrimination under Title VII? It is to that question—the issue of
the continued vitality and viability of this only portion of Price Waterhouse that
was not legislatively superseded—that attention now will be focused.
V. PRICE WATERHOUSE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
A quick review of post-Price Waterhouse opinions reveals that the lower
federal courts have overwhelmingly, albeit not unanimously, acknowledged
that gender nonconformity-based claims are cognizable under Title VII and that
the plaintiff’s sexual orientation or transgender status is not per se fatal to such a
84
claim. Nevertheless, while talking the talk, they rarely walk the walk. While
giving lip service to the notion that any plaintiff can fall within Title VII’s
protective umbrella when alleging a case of sex-based discrimination, the lower
courts typically reject claims by plaintiffs whose unconventional behavior or
presentation of self can be seen to implicate their sexual orientation or
85
transgendered identity. Compelled by the dichotomous legal framework to
pigeon-hole these cases, nearly all courts continue to insist that hostility towards
an individual’s sexual orientation or transgendered identity is a self-standing
phenomenon, unrelated to and independent of the perpetuation of gendered
86
norms. They decline to recognize that sanctions levied on individuals for
behaving or presenting themselves in a fashion commonly associated with
homosexual orientation or transgendered status are themselves a function of
community disapproval of the plaintiffs’ refusal or failure to adhere to gendered
87
notions about appearance, attire, as well as sexual and nonsexual behavior.
Moreover, they ignore the fact of the imperfect linkage between sexual
orientation or transgendered status and nonconforming behavior. The courts do
not acknowledge that there are straight men and women who do not conform to
gendered behavior or appearance norms and gay men and women who do. It is
well established that in ruling on summary judgment motions “[t]he evidence of
the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
88
his favor.” Nevertheless, the courts seize upon the presumed connection
between the plaintiffs’ behavior or appearance, and their real or perceived
sexual orientation or transgendered status, to conclude that the underlying
motivation behind the challenged employment action is homophobia rather
than gender stereotyping. This, in turn, leads the courts to conclude that the
plaintiffs in these cases are attempting disingenuously to bootstrap a statutorily

84. See infra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
86. Id.
87. See generally Case, supra note 81; Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of
Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187 (1988).
88. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
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unrecognized sexual orientation claim into a statutorily viable allegation of sexbased discrimination.
All circuit courts that have considered the issue now agree with the
principle articulated in Price Waterhouse that nonconformity to gendered
expectations can constitute a form of statutorily proscribed sex-based
discrimination survived the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Moreover,
all circuits agree that the fact that the plaintiff is gay, perceived to be gay, or
89
transgendered is not fatal to such a claim. Rather, they avow, the relevant issue
is whether the plaintiff can allege and, ultimately, prove that the discrimination
was motivated by his failure or refusal to conform to sex stereotyped
expectations, and not because of her sexual orientation or transgendered
identity. Thus, as long as the plaintiff can establish that he was discriminated
against because of his failure to conform to sex-stereotyped expectations, his
sexual orientation or identity bears no independent legal relevance to his claim.
Consequently, in Title VII cases where a plaintiff alleges discrimination
associated with his or her unconventional behavior, attire, or other form of
90
presentation of self, the courts usually, though not always, reject defense
91
motions to dismiss based solely on the pleadings. In response to a defendant’s
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted or motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), as long as
the plaintiff has not couched the complaint solely in terms of sexual orientation
92
or transgender, but has made some explicit reference to failure or refusal to

89. But see Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, 2003 WL 21525058 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (finding that
the Price Waterhouse ruling does not reverse extant jurisprudence that Title VII does not apply to
claims by transgendered plaintiff as prohibition against sex-based discrimination does not extend to
discrimination on the basis of sexual identity).
90. See Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that transsexual
plaintiff who was born male but was declined employment after informing prospective employer
that she would present herself as a woman and display photos of herself dressed in traditionally
feminine workplace-appropriate attire did not state gender stereotype-based claim of sex
discrimination because plaintiff was a female who met the defendant’s sex-stereotyped expectations
of a female employee, and that discrimination on the basis of transsexual identity might itself
constitute discrimination on the basis of sex and so decision on motion to dismiss postponed until
factual record can be created on this latter issue).
91. See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming trial court’s denial of
Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on pleadings where born-male plaintiff who was disciplined after
appearing at work as a woman alleged that he was discriminated against because his conduct and
mannerisms did not conform with the employer’s and co-workers’ sex stereotypes of how a man
should look and behave); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., 2006 WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (preoperative transsexual who was terminated after announcing intention to transition from male to
female states a claim since complaint alleges that he was discriminated against for failure to conform
to gender stereotypes); Tronetti v. TLC Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., 2003 WL 22757935 (W.D.N.Y.
2003) (plaintiff who was born a man and who informed employer at time of hiring that he was a
transsexual in transition and would appear at work wearing overtly feminine attire states a claim
under Title VII as he alleged that he was discriminated against for not acting like a man); Centola v.
Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002) (gay male plaintiff who never disclosed his sexual
orientation states a claim of sexual harassment by alleging that the offending comments mocked his
masculinity, portrayed him as effeminate, and that the harassment was caused by his failure to meet
male gender stereotypes).
92. See Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
complaint brought by male homosexual postal worker subjected to barrage of pejorative comments
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conform to gendered expectations, most courts permit the case to go forward.
Rather than discard the plaintiff’s case at this preliminary stage of the
proceedings, federal courts typically provide the parties with an opportunity to
engage in discovery in order to generate a factual basis for assessing the
93
motivation behind the challenged action.
Yet not all plaintiffs overcome even this initial hurdle. For example, in
Schroer v. Billington the trial judge ruled that a plaintiff’s allegations of sex
stereotyping did not state a claim under Title VII, even though the transsexual
plaintiff’s complaint alleged discrimination for failure to conform to stereotyped
94
appearance expectations. This transsexual plaintiff who was born male was
declined employment after informing the prospective employer that the plaintiff
would be presenting herself as a woman on the job and providing photos of
95
herself dressed in traditionally female workplace-appropriate attire. The trial
judge ruled that the complaint did not state a claim of gender stereotyping
because the plaintiff, who initially presented as a male but who indicated an
intention to present as a female, was treated by the court as a female who was
96
conforming to the employer’s gendered expectations of a female employee. The
court blithely ignored the obvious fact that this employer was motivated by its
disapproval of a man choosing to change his sexual identification, and behave
and dress like a woman. However, by disingenuously treating the plaintiff as a
woman who did conform to the female stereotype, the court was able to
97
conclude that the plaintiff did not even state a claim for gender nonconformity.
Interestingly, however, the trial judge did not dismiss the complaint. The court
suggested that discrimination on the basis of transsexual identity as such might
constitute a form of sex-based discrimination and postponed disposing of the
motion to dismiss until the parties had an opportunity to present a factual
98
record on this question.
Nevertheless, a plaintiff who beats back a defense motion to dismiss the
complaint for insufficient pleading is generally confronted with another attempt
by his or her employer to obtain a pre-trial dismissal of the case, usually via a
motion for summary judgment. In this context, the courts look beyond the face
of the pleadings to the evidence obtained through various discovery tools to
determine whether the plaintiff has unearthed enough facts to warrant a trial on

from co-workers relating to his homosexuality because the allegations referred only to plaintiff’s
sexual orientation and did not assert that he had been discriminated against because he did not act
like a man).
93. But see Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 1999132 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming trial court’s
grant of Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss complaint brought by private police officer who never
discussed his sexuality with any co-workers but who was subjected to onslaught of sexually-based
slurs and derogatory remarks on ground that the plaintiff’s alleged harassment was based on his
sexual orientation and that Price Waterhouse stereotyping doctrine does not extend to presumed
sexual behavior that is not observable in the workplace).
94. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203.
95. Id. at 205.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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the issue of whether the challenged action was motivated by sex-based as
opposed to sexual orientation- or transgendered status-based prejudice.
It is one thing to satisfy the federal courts’ liberal notice pleading
99
requirements. The body of published case law demonstrates, however, that is
quite another to convince the courts that there is sufficient evidence to defeat a
defense motion for summary judgment and go to trial. Once the focus of the
courts’ attention shifts from the sufficiency of the pleadings to the sufficiency of
proof, plaintiffs’ fortunes dramatically deteriorate. In case after case, with only a
few notable exceptions, the courts have rejected the plaintiff’s sex-stereotype
theory and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding
that the plaintiff had not offered evidence that would support a finding that the
defendant’s conduct was based, in whole or in part, on the individual’s failure to
conform to gendered norms. Rather, they insist, the evidence revealed that the
employer’s bias was based upon hostility to the plaintiff’s real or perceived
100
homosexual or transsexual identity. The courts clearly are suspicious of

99. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
100. See Myers v. Cuyahoga County, 2006 WL 1479081 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (affirming
summary judgment for defense when there was evidence that supervisor referred to transsexual
plaintiff as “he/she” is an isolated remark remote in time from plaintiff’s termination that does not
rebut substantial defense evidence of legitimate explanation for her discharge and therefore,
assuming plaintiff established a prima facie case of gender nonconformity did not create a jury
question on pretext); Medina v. Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming
summary judgment for defense when heterosexual plaintiff alleged harassment and retaliation by
lesbian supervisor did not offer any evidence that she did not dress or behave like a stereotypical
woman, and when her claim is that she was punished for not acting like a stereotypical lesbian and
that constitutes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398
F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirming summary judgment for defense, court states that stereotypical
notions about how men and women should behave often necessarily blur into ideas about
homosexuality and, therefore, gender stereotyping claim should not be used to bootstrap protection
for sexual orientation into Title VII ); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir.
2003) (affirming summary judgment for defense when heterosexual male employee who was called
“faggot”, “bisexual” and “girl scout” by co-workers established only his co-workers’ hostility
towards his sexual orientation and not disapproval of his nonconforming conduct); Bibby v. Phila.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002) (affirming
summary judgment for defense when gay male employee who alleged acts of supervisorial and coworker harassment did not offer any evidence that he was harassed for failing to conform to societal
stereotype of how men should behave or appear); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 995 (2001) (affirming summary judgment for defense when evidence
that co-worker referred to plaintiff as “faggot” and “gay” and posted homophobic graffiti on bulletin
board established that harassment was not motivated by his failure to live up to male image but that
it was the result only of hostility to his perceived homosexuality); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for defense when plaintiff who
alleged on appeal that he was mocked by a barrage of derogatory names and obscene remarks for
speaking in a high-pitched voice and mimicking feminine movements and was subjected to
offensive comments concerning alleged homosexual activities established only that harassment was
based on his sexual orientation, not his sex). See also Martin v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 224 F.
Supp. 2d 434, 447 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting defense summary judgment on Title VII harassment
claim brought by gay male employee who offered evidence of offensive and degrading sexual
comments, physical assaults, and distribution of sexually explicit pictures in his work areas on
ground that record was devoid of evidence that he acted in an effeminate manner and so plaintiff
had not established discrimination on basis of non-conformity; court wants to avoid bootstrapping
sexual orientation claim under Title VII and if “it is difficult to determine where gender ends and
sexual orientation begins” court requires evidence that harassment was targeted at plaintiff’s non-
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gender-stereotyping claims asserted by gay or transgendered plaintiffs.
Choosing not to recognize any connection between sexual orientation bias and
the perpetuation of gender norms, the courts routinely assert that such claimants
are trying merely to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation prejudice into
101
Title VII. Yet in doing so, these courts also ignore the mixed-motive analysis
codified at §703(m) of Title VII as amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Even if
the evidence does demonstrate that the employer’s decision was linked to the
plaintiff’s sexual orientation or identity, pursuant to the mixed motive doctrine,
as long as the plaintiff can establish that her failure to conform to gender norms
was also a motivating factor behind the challenged action, she can prevail under
Title VII. Nevertheless, with rare exception, the courts have chosen to ignore this
statutory provision entirely, concluding instead that the tendered evidence
revealed only hostility to the plaintiff’s sexual orientation or transgendered
identity.
VI. A CAUTIONARY NOTE OF OPTIMISM
There are, however, three notable circuit court opinions and one published
trial court judgments that serve as exceptions to the general pattern. The most
102
recognized example is the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati.
In that case, Phelicia Barnes, a pre-operative transsexual, was dismissed for
failing to pass the training portion of the probationary period that was a
103
prerequisite to becoming a sergeant on the police force. Barnes was the only
104
sergeant trainee to fail probation in a seven-year period. Barnes alleged that he
was flunked out of the training program and subjected to greater scrutiny than
other probationary officers because he failed to conform to the department’s
105
stereotyped view of male behavior. The City insisted that Barnes had been
106
dismissed for poor performance during his probationary period. The trial
court denied all of the defense’s pretrial motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment, and after the jury rendered a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, also
107
denied defense post-verdict motions for judgment as a matter of law. The
plaintiff had lived as a male while on duty but was in the process of
108
transitioning to a woman off duty.
Members of the vice squad had
photographed him at night while he was dressed in traditionally feminine attire
and the plaintiff occasionally had reported to work wearing makeup or
109
lipstick. One supervisor had accused Barnes of not appearing sufficiently
masculinity); Ianetta v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D. Mass. 2002) (granting defense
motion for summary judgment when evidence of two instances in which plaintiff was called a
“faggot” is not sufficient evidence of sexual stereotyped expectations but reveals only animosity
towards the plaintiff’s sexual orientation).
101. See, e.g., Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218; Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).
102. 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2004).
103. Id. at 733–34.
104. Id. at 735.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 733.
108. Id. at 733.
109. Id. at 734.
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masculine, had warned him to stop wearing makeup, and had urged him to act
110
in a more masculine fashion. The Sixth Circuit panel unanimously upheld the
111
trial judge’s denial of the defendant’s post-trial motions. It found that there
was sufficient evidence to support Barnes’ claim that he had been discriminated
112
against for his failure to conform to sex stereotypes. Moreover, it also upheld
the trial court’s issuance of a mixed motive instruction on the ground that the
plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that his failure
to conform to gendered norms had, at a minimum, been a motivating factor
113
behind his termination.
114
In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., a male restaurant worker
who had been subjected to a relentless barrage of disparaging and vulgar
insults, including “faggot,” being called “she” and “her,” and being mocked for
walking and carrying his serving tray “like a woman,” lost his case after a bench
115
trial of his Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation claims. The trial judge
determined that the harassment was both not hostile and had not occurred
116
because of the plaintiff’s sex. But the Ninth Circuit panel reversed those
rulings, finding that the harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive to
117
alter the plaintiff’s terms and conditions of employment and that, more
significantly, like Ann Hopkins, appellant Antonio Sanchez had established that
the abuse directed at him by co-workers and a supervisor reflected their belief
118
that he did not conform to the behavior expected of a person of his sex. In their
view, by displaying feminine mannerisms in the way he walked and carried his
119
serving tray, Sanchez did not act as a man should behave. Accordingly, the
court ruled that Sanchez was entitled to prevail on his sexual harassment
120
claim.
The final member of the circuit court triad is the Seventh Circuit’s decision
121
in Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill. The trial court had granted summary judgment to
the City as to the plaintiff’s Title VII sexual harassment and constructive
122
discharge claims. The plaintiff had offered evidence of being subjected to
homophobic epithets, sexually-oriented derogatory remarks, and physical
123
assaults. The appellate court reversed the trial judge’s decision to grant
124
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. It ruled that the plaintiff could
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111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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124.

Id. at 735.
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id.
256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 870.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 873.
Id.
Id. at 870.
Id. at 878.
119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
119 F.3d at 566.
Id. at 566–67.
Id. at 566.
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go to trial on his same-sex harassment claim on two alternative grounds. First,
the appellate panel reasoned that, since the harassment involved conduct that
was explicitly sexual, this was sufficient to state a claim of sexual harassment,
126
regardless of whether or not the conduct was gender-specific. Alternatively,
the court declared that even if the sexual character of the same-sex harassment
was not sufficient per se to violate the statutory ban on sex discrimination, the
fact that the plaintiff was subjected to that harassment because the way he
presented himself did not conform to his coworkers’ view of appropriate male
127
behavior was enough to state a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII.
With respect to the second of these rulings, the appellate court also found that
the evidence, including the fact that the plaintiff was harassed for wearing an
earring, supported a finding that stereotypes had animated the harassing
128
behavior.
Perhaps the most thoughtful analysis of a gender nonconformity claim can
129
be found in Centola v. Potter. Stephen Centola had been tormented over his
seven year career as a letter carrier with the U.S. Postal Service by comments
made by his coworkers who mocked his masculinity and by their distribution of
130
photos that portrayed him as effeminate and implied that he was gay. He was
summarily discharged after complaining about this behavior to his
131
supervisors. In response to his Title VII claim alleging sexual harassment and
retaliation, the defendant sought summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff
was alleging only sexual orientation-based discrimination which was not
132
cognizable under Title VII. As District Judge Gertner noted, the plaintiff had
both alleged that the harassment was motivated, at least in part, by his failure to
meet gendered stereotypes of what a man should act or look like and had
offered evidence in his summary judgment papers to substantiate that
133
allegation.
And though she acknowledged that “the line between
discrimination because of sexual orientation and discrimination because of sex is
134
hardly clear,” she also recognized that “[s]exual orientation harassment is
often, if not always, motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually defined
gender norms. In fact, stereotypes about homosexuality are directly related to

125. Id. at 568.
126. Id. at 574.
127. Id. at 575.
128. Although the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit panel’s ruling, the case was
remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court’s ruling in Oncale. The decision in Oncale
instructed courts to focus on whether or not the plaintiff suffered the harassment because of his or
her sex. Consequently, it was the first of the two alternative theories propounded by the Seventh
Circuit that resulted in ruling to vacate. There was nothing, however, in Oncale to call into question
the correctness of the Seventh Circuit’s alternative holding that if proof of sex-based motivation was
necessary, it was met by proving that the harassment was visited upon the plaintiff for failing to live
up to expected gender stereotypes. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263 n.5
(3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002).
129. 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002).
130. Id. at 407.
131. Id. at 406.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 409 n.6.
134. Id. at 408.
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135

our stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women.” When co-workers
and/or supervisors take adverse action against a gay male employee, she
continued, “[t]he gender stereotype at work here is that ‘real’ men should date
136
women, and not other men.” Refusing to fall into the trap of feeling compelled
to choose between sexual orientation and sex as the causal factor behind the
alleged harassment, Judge Gertner properly invoked mixed motive doctrine,
“precisely because of the difficulty in differentiating behavior that is prohibited
(discrimination on the basis of sex) from behavior that is not prohibited
137
(discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).” Stephen Centola had never
138
disclosed his sexual orientation to his co-workers or supervisors. Nevertheless,
Judge Gertner determined, Centola’s co-employees “leapt to the conclusion that
139
Centola ‘must’ be gay because they found him to be effeminate.” Judge
Gertner concluded that their conduct, including the placement of a picture of
Richard Simmons in pink hot pants in Centola’s work area, was sufficient to
support the plaintiff’s gender nonconformity claim and, therefore, to defeat the
140
defense request for summary judgment and have the opportunity to convince
141
a jury of the merits of his sexual harassment claim.
VII. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
So what is to be made of the predominant judicial attitude towards the
enforcement of dress and appearance codes, particularly against individuals
whose presentation of self is a direct outgrowth of their nontraditional lifestyle?
There is no doubt that the majority of rulings in these cases reflect, in large part,
the undeniable fact that Congress has made manifest its disinclination to extend

135. Id. at 410.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 407.
139. Id.
140. The trial judge also denied the defense motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Title
VII retaliation claim. 183 F. Supp. 2d at 413. However, the trial judge did grant the defense motion
for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims that the sexual harassment violated two Executive
Orders. Id. at 414.
141. See also Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Ore. 2002)
(denying defense motion for summary judgment on Title VII sex discrimination claim brought by
terminated lesbian employee; evidence sufficient to permit reasonable jury to find that plaintiff was
repeatedly harassed because of her sex in that she did not conform to manager’s stereotype that a
woman should be attracted to and date only men). Yet in Mowery v. Escambia County Utils. Auth.,
2006 WL 327965 (N.D. Fla. 2006), the trial court granted a defense motion for summary judgment on
a Title VII sex discrimination claim where the plaintiff had offered evidence of sexually oriented and
homophobic comments. The court denounced the plaintiff’s “attempts to place his own interpretive
‘spin’ on the alleged harassment and classify it as harassment based on sex or gender rather than as
harassment based on sexual orientation.” Id. at *8. The court also repudiated arguments “by some
commentators who characterize sex and sexual orientation as ‘intricately interrelated,’” id., on the
ground that Congress’ refusal to amend Title VII to include sexual orientation displayed Congress’
determination that there is a meaningful distinction between sex and sexual orientation. Finally, the
court reasoned, a co-worker’s statement that the plaintiff must be gay because he was forty years
old, owned a house, had a truck paid for, did not have a woman, and did not discuss sexual exploits
with women was not based on the plaintiff’s perceived failure to conform to male gendered
stereotype because owning a truck is commonly associated with a masculine gender role.
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statutory protection against employment discrimination to gay and
transgendered individuals. At the same time, the courts do recognize that gay
and transgendered individuals can be the subject of unlawful sex-based
discrimination. After all, every court would unqualifiedly recognize that
discrimination against any individual, regardless of their sexual identity, is
proscribed if it is based on his or her sex. For example, if an employer refused to
hire lesbians but employed similarly qualified gay men, one cannot imagine a
court failing to strike down such a policy as violative of Title VII. Moreover, the
fact is that the courts rarely grant 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss claims brought by
gay or transgendered individuals who assert a Price Waterhouse-styled claim of
gender stereotype-based discrimination. This reflects the prevailing judicial
acceptance of the notion that employment policies penalizing individuals for
failing to conform to gendered expectations constitutes a form of statutorily
proscribed sex-based discrimination. Yet, when it comes to assessing the
evidence for the purpose of defining the motivation behind the challenged
employment decisions, the courts invariably conclude that the plaintiff was
targeted not for failing to conform to gendered standards of acceptable dress,
behavior, or presentation of self, but solely and exclusively because of his or her
sexual orientation or transgendered status.
The courts’ facile and superficial response to these cases cruelly ignores the
connection between an individual’s sexual identity and various aspects of his or
her behavior and presentation of self. Disapprobation of an individual’s
homosexuality or transgendered identity is nothing more or less than
condemnation of that person’s failure or refusal to adhere to traditional
expectations of how a “real” man or woman should live his or her life and/or
present him or herself to the outside world. Whether it is based on how they
dress, how they carry themselves, how they groom themselves, or with whom
they choose to engage in sexual conduct, these decisions are, at their core, based
on a prejudice against individuals’ nonconformity to those societally generated
norms of behavior imposed on members of each of the two biological sexes.
Consequently, firing a man because he chooses to dress in attire or manifest
behavior that would be perfectly acceptable for a woman, or terminating a
woman because she chooses not to adhere to the company’s cosmetic image of
femininity, or for that matter, terminating either a man or a woman because he
or she chooses to have a sexual relationship with a person of the same biological
sex, should be subject to the same legal declaration of unacceptability that
would extend to a decision to terminate a woman because she is deemed too
aggressive and insufficiently lady-like.
On the other hand, is it reasonable or even appropriate to expect the courts
to embrace the linkage between sexual identity and gendered behavioral norms
when Congress has consistently and emphatically rejected all direct attempts to
provide statutory protection to gays and transgendered persons? Are the courts
correct in suggesting that adopting this theory would simply circumvent
Congress’ clear statement that sexual orientation and transgendered status are
matters of personal choice that fall outside the protective ambit of government
regulation? I don’t think so. There is no reason to suggest that Congress actively
has considered the implications of the Court’s ruling in Price Waterhouse to cases
involving the enforcement of workplace rules that enforce sex-stereotypical
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norms. Nor is their any evidence of Congressional dissatisfaction with, or
repudiation of, the Court’s articulation of a sex-stereotype based model of sexbased discrimination. To the contrary, Congress’ partial overruling of the mixed
motive portion of the Court’s ruling in Price Waterhouse in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act confirms that Congress is fully ready, willing and able to overturn the
Court’s interpretations of its handiwork. Moreover, in our common law system,
it is quite ordinary for Congress to speak in bold strokes and leave the details,
and sometimes the juridical dirty work, to the courts. Therefore, if the courts
were to conclude that hostility towards a person’s sexual identity is a form of
gender-stereotyped sex discrimination because it is predicated on a rejection of
lifestyle choices that do not adhere to traditional formulations of how a man or a
woman should look or behave, including one’s choice of a sexual partner, that
decision fairly could be justified as a reasonable application of the legislatively
untouched portion of the ruling in Price Waterhouse.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite occasional victories, workers who are subjected to workplace rules
governing the way they dress, behave, and present themselves typically are
unsuccessful in convincing the federal trial and appellate courts that they are the
victims of sex-stereotyped attitudes, particularly when their refusal or failure to
abide by these rules is linked to a refusal to conform to societally created sexspecific norms of behavior and appearance. Instead, the courts generally
continue to decline to recognize the relationship between sexual identity and
gendered norms of behavior. Consequently, the judiciary fails to accept the
plaintiffs’ claim that they have been victimized by virtue of their failure or
refusal to conform to gendered expectations. When individuals perceived to be
leading a nontraditional lifestyle or presenting an unconventional sexual
identity invoke the Court’s seemingly unambiguous declaration that gender
nonconformity is a form of proscribed sex-based discrimination, the promise of
Price Waterhouse goes largely unfulfilled.

